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A m y B u g
Has Feminism Changed Physics?
Someone once said: “Scientists and prostitutes get paid for doing what
they enjoy.”
—Stephen Hawking, Black Holes and Baby Universes and Other Essays
(1993, 16)
Women’s work is of a particular kind . . . it always involves personal ser-
vice. It requires caring labor—the labor of love.
—Hillary Rose, Sex and Scientific Inquiry (1987, 275)
I n this article, I assess the recent manner in which feminist ideas havecontributed to Western physics. This assessment is complicated, forthere exists a strong tension between differently aimed critiques of the
field. Among practitioners, there is an inclination to distinguish sharply
between issues of “physics” and issues of “physicists.” Thus, on the one
hand, most physicists concede that the gender and racial composition of
physics students is in need of balance. This is correlated with a mainstream
movement to create race- and gender-friendly “niches” in the university
for students who are “different” and with efforts by women physicists to
network, mentor, recruit, and retain more women and help each other
build healthy careers within the mainstream. On the other hand, most
physicists presume that feminist critique is incapable of generating ideas
that will make a superfluid colder, a plasma hotter, or a particle beam
more intense. This is correlated with the fact that feminism has done
essentially nothing to transform what one might call “orthodox physics”:
the body of laws, the rules of inference that relate laws to consequences,
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and the experimental methodologies by which physicists interact with and
build abstractions of the natural world. Finally, most physicists would like
to see more young people pursue physics and to have more sympathy for
physics from an educated public. This is correlated with the existence of
a physics education reform movement, which is thriving. Yet this move-
ment is largely disconnected from the literature on race-, class-, and gen-
der-dependence in knowledge acquisition strategies.
Getting the right number: Education reform
To the uninitiated, demographics is the only issue relevant to women in
physics. This does not imply, however, that this concern is foolish or
misplaced. It may be that a “critical mass” must be achieved before fem-
inism within the field of physics can mature and proceed as in other fields.
To date, women are seriously underrepresented in physics: in 1998,
women constituted 51 percent of the world population, and in the United
States 21 percent of the bachelor’s degree recipients, 13 percent of Ph.D.s,
17 percent of assistant professors, and 3 percent of full professors (the
figure did not change in the four years between 1994 and 1998). Women
are 40 percent more likely than men to be hired in a part-time job (Ivie
and Stowe 2000). Members of underrepresented minority groups are
under-underrepresented. In 1997, fewer than 2 percent of physics Ph.D.s
went to black Americans. Of these fifteen people, fourteen were men
(National Science Foundation 2000). In 1996, Roman Czujko reported
that the number of institutions with no women on the physics staff had
dropped from 55 percent to (only!) 35 percent in a decade and that
essentially no progress had been made in the number of African-American
and Hispanic Ph.D. recipients.
In order to recruit and retain physics students, a physics education
reform movement has taken hold. The Physical Science Study Committee
(established at MIT by Jerrold Zacharrias) took up the work in the 1960s.
Since 1989, Project Kaleidoscope, a national alliance of scholars, has
worked to reform physics as well as other sciences, mathematics, and
engineering. In 1999, the American Association of Physics Teachers
(AAPT) and the American Institute of Physics (AIP) founded a Task Force
on Undergraduate Physics (Hilborn 2000). The goal was a major revi-
talization of undergraduate physics courses. There are currently at least
twenty U.S. graduate programs offering Ph.D.s in the field of physics
education research (PER) and thirty-five tenure-track positions in PER
for people who specialize in “how students learn physics” (Lopez and
Schultz 2001).
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All of the notable curricular movements have what we might recognize
as “female-friendly” activities (Rosser 1990, 1995). Examples include Eric
Mazur’s “peer instruction” (1997), in which students interact in small
groups and either agree or agree to disagree on answers; Wolfgang Christian
and colleagues’ “just-in-time-teaching” (Novak et al. 1999), in which stu-
dents engage in face-to-face coaching on problem-solving skills, professors
use their students’ own words in lecture, and the program stresses the
importance of the professor’s learning about the experiences of individual
students, not just the class as a whole; Lillian McDermott’s “inquiry-based
physics” (1996), a program that allows students to begin with their own
speculations, make extended observations, and develop their own concepts
and models to construct knowledge; and Priscilla Laws’s “workshop
physics” (1997), which features hands-on activities with both specialized
and nonspecialized laboratory equipment and which is predicated on the
idea of lecture-free “active learning” and of trusting a student to teach
herself or himself additional material. In polling more than a dozen uni-
versities that offer advanced degrees in physics education, I found much
sensitivity to difference, good will toward women succeeding in physics,
and substantial female populations of students and postdocs. In three cases,
I was told that issues of women were a side interest on which participants
had done research.
In summary, the good news about PER is that many of its axioms are
feminist related, for example, that the student body should be more diverse
ethnically and economically and that physics should be taught to empha-
size its connection to the daily lives of people in our society (Hilborn
2000). On the other hand, the axioms show a very early feminist stage
of curricular reform. Sue Rosser (1997) notes that faculty who have in-
itiated programs to attract and retain more science students, including
women, typically come from the sciences and typically (though not always)
do not have an extensive knowledge of women’s studies and feminist
theory.1 For example, we might not hear an explicit mention of the
women-and-minorities problem but, rather, a reference to “different
types of students,” nor would there be explicit mention of historically
black or women’s colleges but an oblique comment that “departments
have different missions” (Hilborn 2000). In a recent article in Physics
Today, the authors discuss how cognitive science research shaped the
1 Priscilla Auchincloss, Karen Barad, Angela Barton, Ingrid Bartsch, Kaye Edwards, Anne
Fausto-Sterling, Scott Gilbert, Bonnie Schulman, and Bonnie Spanier are just a few of many
“full-fledged” scientists with full women’s studies credentials who have designed science
curricula.
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kindergarten–grade 8 (K–8) science education reform movement (Lopez
and Schultz 2001), yet there is no mention of the extensive cognitive
science literature on how the gender of the child plays a role in learning
behaviors.2 In a box labeled “Are You Part of the Consensus?” there is
a list of items instructors want their students to know and to be able to
do. While many of these are not inconsistent with a feminist teaching of
science—“Okay to take risks,” “no wrong answers,” or “team-
work”—none critique science and none are overtly feminist. A pedagogue
taking the traditional approach—one that Karen Barad (1995) describes
as a boyish, Feynmanesque, “physics is phun” one—could have penned
them all. This situation might remind those with a knowledge of social
history of the social action movements of the 1960s and the lack of direct
attention paid to women’s issues in “the Movement,” which eventually
spawned a separate women’s movement (Curthoys 1988).
One wonders whether the reason that “the pipeline leaks” and that
women leave physics at each ascending professional level is that there is
a cost for being different, for speaking in a Gilligan-type (Gilligan 1982)
“different voice” among one’s adult peers in the scientific community
(Faludi 1991). The mainstream deems it fine to offer introductory courses
with alternative curricula based on different ways of knowing. It becomes
progressively less fine for one to display the traditionally devalued way of
speaking or knowing as one ascends the educational ladder. (Is the as-
sumption, therefore, that these courses will get women and minorities
through some immature phase so that they may subsequently use only
orthodox scientific expression and practices?) This is reminiscent of the
lack of women and “increasing defeminization” as one ascends in other
professions, for example, in literary scholarship wherein “the price of the
ticket into the professional ranks is, to use Fetterley’s provocative term,
cognitive and discursive ‘immasculation’—learning to think and argue like
a man” (Schweickart 1996, 314–15). This also resonates with recounted
experiences of aspiring professionals who are nonwhite and who function
in a white professional sphere: “We had to hang up our nativeness outside
the door and come in and think like white people” (Goldberger 1996,
337).
If a “rising tide lifts all boats” philosophy were valid, explicit consid-
eration of feminist ideas would not be necessary in PER. Yet the feminist
2 Bibliographies can be found on this subject, including those by Faye A. Chadwell
(Rosser 1995, 231) and Laura McCullough (2001a). In addition, see Belenky et al. 1986;
Campbell 1992; Philbin et al. 1995; Giese 1996; Bauer and Shea 1999; Hodari 1999; Kimura
2000.
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literature suggests otherwise. There are different male/female responses
to some of the techniques and tests at the forefront of college-level physics
reform (Laws, Rosborough, and Poodry 1999; McCullough 2001a,
2001b). While results remain preliminary, tests rewritten to feature female-
friendly situations have been found to improve women’s scores in greater
proportion than men’s (McCullough 2001b). Certain questions about
rockets and cannonballs may give male students a gender-related advan-
tage (McCullough and Meltzer 2001). Claude M. Steele (1997) notes
that the “stereotype threat” implied in merely being asked to put one’s
race down on a questionnaire before taking a test depresses minority
performance, yet it seems slightly to enhance majority performance, es-
pecially in mathematics. Elaine Seymour’s and Nancy Hewitt’s extensive
work on why women and men switch out of science, mathematics, or
engineering (SME) majors finds a wealth of qualitatively different re-
sponses to the same classroom stimuli, depending on the race and gender
of the respondent (Seymour 1995; Seymour and Hewitt 1997). Clearly,
there is an as yet unrealized opportunity for feminist ideas to join with
the dynamic PER movement and infuse some vital knowledge that is
rooted in feminist research.
The mainstream has recognized the fact that segregated mentoring or
learning environments seem to work in physics, as shown, for example,
in the stunning successes of historically black (two-thirds of all African-
American physics bachelor’s degrees in 1999) and women’s colleges (Mul-
vey and Nicholson 2001). Gender-friendly niches have sprung up: special
programs for minorities at major universities and labs, networking activities
for graduate students on campus, and women’s networking sessions at
major meetings. Yet at well-known universities that have some of these
outreach programs in place, it is not unusual to also see an entire semester’s
departmental physics colloquium schedule without a single woman
speaker. A well-informed article on the subject of diversity programs at
various universities recently published in Science magazine in a section
titled “Trends in Undergraduate Education” (Gonza´lez 2001) describes
strategies, including early involvement in research and mentoring, that
allow African-American students to surmount barriers (Rey 2001). Yet,
in an adjacent article on the subject of early involvement in research, it
is not mentioned that this has proven good for women and minorities
(Mervis 2001). In another nearby article, on the newly perceived impor-
tance of mentoring at the undergraduate through postdoctoral levels,
there is no mention of issues relating to a student’s race, gender, or class.
The very existence of such articles is heartening. Yet the lack of these
natural connections being made between articles on “regular” and “spe-
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cial” types of students shows that reforms, while consistent with feminism,
have not been fully integrated into the mainstream.
Culture clash, culture lag
In the science wars, scholars who hope for acceptance in both feminist
and science communities are sometimes caught in a no (wo)man’s land.3
People are rarely able to engage in both scientific and feminist research
(Auchincloss 1996). When they do, their energies may be placed in areas
that are outmoded from the point of view of mainstream feminist scholars
yet radical from the point of view of mainstream scientists. Scott Gilbert
(personal communication, 2001) reports that his gender-study group’s
influential critique of cell biology (the thrust of which is that feminist
critiques are scientifically important to a field that is marred by gendered
metaphors of fertilization and other processes) went unnoticed and unem-
braced by mainstream feminist scholars until mainstream antifeminist
scholars Paul Gross and Norman Levitt targeted it (Gross and Levitt
1994).4 A recent rejection letter for funding to bring a feminism/science
performer to the Swarthmore campus reads: “The members of the Com-
mittee felt that B is somewhat dated as a feminist performer.” The “dated”
performance revolved around women scientists who were lost to history
and of whom a traditionally educated physicist still learns nothing.
The sluggishness with which natural scientists have set about to re-
position women in their history and praxis stands in remarkable contrast
to the situation in the humanities. Biographical collections of women
scientists published before the 1980s are rare; they have appeared in good
numbers only in recent years.5 Rosser (1988) studied the paucity of fem-
inist papers at scientific meetings (e.g., the American Association for the
Advancement of Science [AAAS]) when compared with the number at a
major meeting of humanists (Modern Language Association [MLA]). She
has also described the waves of feminist science curricular reform, and she
3 The term science wars refers to a recent (within a dozen years) and acrimonious conflict
that has arisen between some scientists and some in the field of science studies. The issues
center on the validity of critiques of traditional theories of scientific knowledge—whether
they are well founded and whether they are injurious to progress in science.
4 The paper in question is Beldecos 1998. It has since been updated as Gilbert 2000.
5 See, e.g., Rossiter 1995; Shearer and Shearer 1996; Reynolds 1999, Ambrose et al.
2000; Ogilvie 2000; Sullivan 2001.
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finds that among a set of prominent national efforts, articulated goals are
either at stages 1, 2, or 3 out of six sequential stages (1998).6
If first-wave historical feminism is the “liberal feminism” of the 1960s
and 1970s (Barton 1998), which corresponds to the “liberal critique”
(Keller 1987) of science that addresses skewed employment yet makes no
claim that science would change with more women, then mainstream
physics is still awash in the first wave. This wave might be said to have
crested with the founding, in 1972, of the Committee on the Status of
Women in Physics (CSWP) of the American Physical Society (APS), the
world’s largest professional organization of physicists. The liberal critique
found its voice with papers such as Vera Kistiakowsky’s (1981) “Women
in Physics: Unnecessary, Injurious, and Out of Place?” As the years have
passed, the slow progress of women and minorities into the professional
sphere has remained a matter of concern (Vetter 1988; Fehrs and Czujko
1992). Currently the mainstream, as represented by organizations like the
AIP (American Institute of Physics), the NSF (National Science Foun-
dation), and major universities, is enthusiastically behind the idea that
more women are needed at all levels. In the words of Howard Georgi,
there is “unconscious discrimination” because physics selects for “asser-
tiveness and single mindedness” (2000). Says Georgi, these qualities are
stand-ins for what we really want as a community of physicists, and they
map well into a set of men (a feminist might correct that to people who
“do male gender” or with “male gender ideologies”) who are able to do
good physics.
Arguments for including women tend to be based on equity concerns,
or the concern that people with good minds should not be turned away
when they might be utilized in the service of physics-as-is. Arguments
tend not, for example, to be based on feminist empiricist claims that only
a diversely gendered group can produce unbiased results or that the prob-
lems chosen and methods used must be divested of an existing Western
or androcentric bias (Harding 1987). Interestingly, cautionary words
along these lines have been articulated by eminent physicists, as in: “It
may be easier to adapt oneself to the quantum-theoretical concept of
reality when one has not gone through the naive materialistic way of
thinking that still prevailed in Europe in the first decades of this century”
6 The six Rosser phases of curricular reform might be described as (1) absence of women
not noted, (2) absence of women noted, (3) barriers to women’s participation identified,
(4) inclusion of historical women scientists, (5) inclusion of women and feminist perspectives
in the doing of science, and (6) reconstruction and redefinition of science to be unreservedly
inclusive.
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(Heisenberg 1958, 202). Yet mainstream physicists are deeply troubled
by feminist epistemologies of science such as those of Helen Longino or
Donna Haraway that claim that a community is required in order to
interpret and ratify the most fundamental acts of observation and under-
standing (Haraway 2001; Longino 2001). That a broader community
could be generative of more good ideas is not troubling to a physicist.
That it could be more objective is. As Evelyn Fox Keller notes, “a first
step . . . in extending the feminist critique to the foundations of scientific
thought is to reconceptualize objectivity” (1987, 238).
Such a reconceptualization is a move that mainstream physicists are
loath to make. Priscilla Auchincloss recently wrote a reasoned and mod-
erate article on physics and feminism in an APS newsletter, suggesting
that “feminist studies may hold a key to the success of efforts to attract
and retain women . . . create gender equitable environments . . . and
to reform physics education” (1998, 15). The responses, in the form of
letters to the editor, were not heartening, with one respondent titling his
reply “Must We Atone for Sins of the Past?” In calling her use of the
word heresy “overwrought,” the respondent himself spins an emotionally
overwrought defense of physics-as-is. Of five replies, only one respondent
(male) demonstrated a working knowledge of women’s studies and la-
mented the inability of the monumental present culture to “stop defining
women as ‘other’” (APS News Online 1998).
The anthropological concept of “culture lag” has been applied by
Henry Etzkowitz, Carol Kemelgor, and Brian Uzzi (2000) to an anti-
quated vision that scientists hold of their own sociopolitical structure.
Physics certainly lags behind most other sciences in providing a culture
that proves desirable to women practitioners. The problem is exacerbated
by the real culture of physics hiding behind an antiquated mask. For
example, the stereotype of the lone investigator obscures the fact that
scientists are members of a community (Harding 1987). Members con-
stantly trade their stocks of “social capital” (Etzkowitz, Kemelgor, and
Uzzi 2000). The “lone investigator” myth impedes recruitment and re-
tention of women in many ways; ultimately, a successful woman must
weave herself into a social network in order to establish collaborators and
win support.
As a second example of a culture lag in physics, consider the widely
held view that physics is the most “fundamental” of natural sciences.
Barbara Whitten (1996) notes that physicists equate fundamentality with
eliteness. She cites evidence that physicists take the existence of a hierarchy
among subfields for granted, with work that is most fundamental (i.e.,
elite) associated with work that probes the tiniest, most elementary con-
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stituents of matter. In this hierarchy, it is no surprise that subfields such
as biophysics and physics education are at the bottom (Whitten 1996).7
(These subfields are interdisciplinary, accessible to more than a few experts,
and contain a societal component. Not coincidentally, they attract a better-
than-average population of women practitioners.) Whitten argues that a
“‘ladder’ of fields is an extremely inadequate picture of science” (1996,
10) and much better is “a web of interconnecting fields, each with its
own emergent properties [and] fundamental concepts” (11). This is a
more modern and accurate view of physics. It is also more feminist if one
agrees with Hillary Rose’s comments that science as a top-down industry
is not a fertile field for feminist reimaginings. Rose opines that “physics
(is) at once the most arcane and the most deeply implicated in the capitalist
system of domination. At the same time, the physical sciences more or
less successfully exclude any more than small numbers of women” (1987,
272).
In summary, as if the true culture of physics were not “chilly” enough
for women and minorities (Franz 1995), women are additionally encum-
bered by certain obsolete, inaccurate perceptions of the sociology of phys-
ics.8 I have given just a couple of examples of such perceptions. These
perceptions are, unfortunately, rooted in the imaginations of physical sci-
entists themselves. In a recent study of imagery in standard geology text-
books, not only did photos and diagrams of people usually depict males
but, while photos depicted males 72 percent of the time, diagrams/draw-
ings did so 95 percent of the time (Phillips and Hausbeck 2001).
What next?
As meager as the feminist content sometimes is, and as divorced as it is
from its identity as feminist content, I believe that feminism has made
a significant impact on the field of physics. The specific nature of modern
curricular reform and the establishment of various niche activities for
women provide two bodies of evidence that support this claim. The
“production of people” has traditionally been viewed as a female vo-
7 Londa Schiebinger has also made this point, as well as cited Sandra Harding on it. See
Schiebinger 1999, chap. 9.
8 The Franz paper documents an APS/NSF-sponsored project led by Franz, Mildred
Dresselhaus, and Bunny Clark to do a national survey of graduate and undergraduate students
on issues of departmental climate. The results of this study have been a catalyst for positive
change in faculty recruitment, creation of safe spaces, opportunities to network with other
women on campus, etc.
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.20 on Mon, 9 Feb 2015 15:43:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
890 ❙ Bug
cation (Rose 1987). While it is vital not to reinforce gender stereotypes
nor to limit the scope of feminist reform by suggesting that it adhere
to outmoded traditions, it would be negligent to fail to observe here
that a commitment to nurturance is apparent in various key mission
statements. The Committee on the Status of Women in Physics (2002)
attempts “to address the encouragement and career development of
women physicists”; the Society of Women Engineers (2002) hopes to
provide “positive stimulation for the achievement of full potential” and
“nurturance of leadership skills.”
Many questions remain about the future of feminism and physics. In-
spired pedagogues have already created a role for different voices and ways
of knowing in introductory and niche or interdisciplinary classes.9 One
wonders, however, whether there will eventually be the same role for
feminist pedagogy in every physics, chemistry, or math course. Also, while
there have been a number of workers who have contributed substantially
to a feminist epistemology of physics, among them Priscilla Auchincloss,
Karen Barad, Evelyn Fox Keller, Sandra Harding, N. Katherine Hayles,
Kristina Rollin, Sharon Traweek, and Barbara Whitten, one wonders
whether feminism will someday have the epistemological relevance to
mainstream physics that it does to other fields where the human connec-
tion is more manifest.
In an attempt to predict the answers to such questions, one might note
that the methodologies and goals of feminism and physics actually have
many similarities. Consider for example these precepts of feminism:
Thought and action must be unified.
Working communities are antielitist.
These have also been central principles of physics from its inception (Keller
1985): “mens et manus” (mind and hands) is the motto of MIT. (Keller,
though, notes the following problems with implementation of the latter
principle: ironically, the overthrow of ancient authority did not include
the overthrow of male authority; and the social component of the revo-
lution was subverted, so that social elites controlled the British Royal
Society.) Both are principles of Baconian science.
On the other hand, consider the principles of feminist science, as they
have been defined by Ruth Bleier (1986) and as I have listed them in the
chart on the next page. In the chart, I assess whether these form part of
9 See, e.g., Barad 1995; Rosser 1995; Schwarz 1996; Barton 1998; Shulman 2001;
Weasel, Honrado, and Bautista 2001.
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the orthodox practice of physics as displayed in mainstream meetings or in
our mainstream literature.
Feminist Scientists Physicists
a) Acknowledge their values and beliefs No
b) Explore how these affect their perspectives No
c) Are explicit and honest about assumptions and methods Yes
d) Are responsible in language Yes (math)
No (metaphors)
e) Eliminate research leading to exploitation of nature No
f) Aim for diversity among participants Yes
g) Recognize the complexity of nature Yes
h) Resist single-cause explanations stripped of social context No
The poor fit between these principles and physical practice suggests
that feminist principles may be so at odds with physics that to be true to
both fields is to profoundly distort both of them. In the words of Harding,
“neither women’s activities nor gender relations . . . can be added to
. . . theoretical discourses without distorting the discourses and our sub-
ject matters” (1987, 283). As I have mentioned earlier, there is an intense
resistance to feminist reimaginings of orthodox physics. Steve Gensemer,
an atomic physicist who is interested in issues of women in physics, has
written: “Inventing a feminist version of quantum mechanics seems an
incredible waste of time after all. What is needed is a way of understanding
the cultural, social, gender, etc. issues in physics without throwing away
our hard-won knowledge” (1998). This is a telling metaphor, one of
knowledge not constructed but won, as in a battle. “Combat physics” is
how women at an international conference this year described a familiar
mode of scholarly interaction (Feder 2002).
If feminism is unable to further have an impact on the field of physics
and if physical science continues to attract scant attention from mainstream
feminists, both fields will be the poorer for it. Women’s studies and fem-
inist theory have insights to offer physics—if physicists would only permit
it! Consider these five closing ideas as launching points for future thought
and discussion:
First, the question “Is physics-as-is androgynous, value free, and the
best physics that humanity can produce?” is not a foolish question meriting
an automatic, affirmative answer. (Harding has posed a number of inter-
esting, related questions [1991, chap. 4].) To begin with, one cannot
claim that physics is “gender neutral,” since feminist science studies teaches
one to define endeavors from the lives of the practitioners. The very fact
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that women’s participation in physics has lagged behind other academic
disciplines and other sciences demonstrates the point. To assert otherwise
is to envision a “physics” that is part of a shadow world of idealized forms,
not a discipline in which real people engage. Furthermore, the physics
literature is not value free. Bias is rarely as blatant as, for example, in a
case history of the Hubble constant that Sharon Begley reported (2000),
where one’s academic affiliation determined which of two values of this
important constant one espoused. Yet, when ideas are presented, no matter
how neutral the language, they can make the oblique point that they are
ascendant and certain others are in eclipse. When a paper begins, as so
many do, “Recently, there has been much interest in X,” the value of
community stands out. As Bonnie Shulman (2001, 416) reminds us, based
on her wealth of evidence drawn from the history of mathematics, we
must teach students to “expect a standpoint in any scientific statement.”
Second, one cannot understand the “Why so few . . . ?” problem in
physics without knowing some basic women’s studies, black studies, La-
tino studies, and so forth. For example, the gender division of labor be-
tween public and private spheres is mirrored in the work choices in the
public sphere. This is integrally related to the low numbers of women in
physics and, as mentioned earlier in the context of Whitten’s work, the
existence of “woman-rich” (e.g., biophysics) and “woman-poor” (e.g.,
plasma physics) subfields.
Third, physicists themselves do not speak in a single voice but use a
“different voice” and different manners of thinking as the occasion war-
rants. There has always been a dialectic between what Karl Sterne calls
“scientific and poetic knowledge” (1965). The best physicists have always
kept the two in balance and known when to apply a greater proportion
of one or the other. There are numerous examples of eminent physicists
who have transported both terminology and substance from one discipline
to another—for example, from religion to physics, or physics to society.10
For various reasons having to do with communication and conceptuali-
zation, physicists sometimes produce creative images or narratives, much
in the manner that Cindy Schwarz (1996) encourages students to do in
her courses on particle physics at Vassar College. Below is an example
drawn from the study of positrons and electrons. These elementary par-
ticles are “opposites” in a very rigorous sense of the word; moreover,
when they meet, they annihilate in a flash of energy. Figure 1 depicts an
electron and positron as belonging to the “opposite” (!) sexes. It was
10 See, e.g., Wertheim 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1995d; Beller 1998; McGrail 1998;Barbour
2000.
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Figure 1 Electron meets positron
chosen by a leader in the field, Zsolt Kajcsos, who included it on the title
page of a major conference proceedings volume that he edited (1992).
Kajcsos told me that it was his little daughter who drew them—“based
on the evening tales I told her.” While this example may seem to reify
traditionally held gender relations, it holds elements of critique available
to adult viewers. (The truly “opposite” character of particle and antipar-
ticle renders the notion of “opposite sexes” ludicrous by comparison!)
This image is important in another way: it chronicles a small girl’s writing
herself—writing an unmistakably female image—into the story and into
the physics.
Fourth, feminist epistemology of science is not monolithic. There are
many such theories of scientific knowledge. Mainstream physics might be
strongly persuaded by one of them, perhaps by that of Kristina Rolin
(1999), a philosopher of science who has recently argued that the activities
that constitute discovery and/or the formulation and justification of cog-
nitive goals in physics are clearly embedded in the discoverer’s gender
identity. Rolin does not argue for relative truth of results of physical
calculations or experiments, and she asserts that the overarching cognitive
value in physics is empirical predictability—ideas embraced by mainstream
physics. Tools of gender analysis are available to the physicist who would
like to explore, for himself or herself, the distinctly gender-related elements
of the discipline (Schiebinger 1999, 186–90).
Finally, ever since the inception of quantum mechanics a century ago
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physicists have recognized that there is a problem with the concept of
“quantum reality.” In the mainstream literature that addresses “quantum
weirdness,” some feminist contributions could be profitably included. Kel-
ler’s 1985 essay “Cognitive Repression in Contemporary Physics” (chap.
7) contains a clear description of what must be dropped from the theory:
an obsolete notion of objectifiability. Barad’s theory of agential realism
makes it clear that one may only talk of an “intra-action” between the
knower and the known, that without the collaboration of the agent of
observation, the idea of “objective properties” is not a sensible one (Barad
1996, 2000). A recent contribution in the orthodox literature, “relational
quantum mechanics” (Rovelli 1996), is not an overtly feminist theory,
yet one might argue that it is nevertheless a Rosser phase 6 theory (Rosser
1998).11 It aspires to provide postulates from which quantum theory can
be derived, or “reconstructed” in the words of Rovelli. Furthermore, and
in agreement with the premises of Barad’s work, Rovelli writes, “Physics
is the theory of the relative information that systems have about each
other. . . . I reject any fundamental distinctions as system/observer . . .
physical system/consciousness” (1996, 1647). Relational quantum me-
chanics (Rovelli 1996; Smolin 2001) has obvious links to the “strong
objectivity” of Harding (1991, chap. 6). Interestingly, while strong ob-
jectivity is so named because the traditional, nonrelative type of scientific
objectivity is viewed to be weaker, just the opposite valuation is placed
by Rovelli: “I want to weaken all physical statements that we make: not
‘the spin is up,’ but ‘we have information that the spin is up’—which
leaves the possibility open to the fact that somebody other has different
information” (1996, 1646; my emphasis).
Should we be surprised that, so far, feminism has done little to accelerate
the minds and hearts of physicists? Should we expect that women will
continue to join the physics community and that as the population rises
toward some critical mass, a feminist physicist consciousness will continue
to mature? Although I have no answer, I hope that the reader has found
some value in a journey through various possibilities and conjectures. In
the physics community, as in the feminist community, the posing of in-
teresting problems and the production of conjectures—even when even-
tually overturned—are validated activities.
Department of Physics and Astronomy
Swarthmore College
11 See n. 6 above.
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